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Simulating the Sleepy Dragon: 
Scenarios for the Welsh Economy
Professor James Foreman-Peck and Dr Laurian Lungu, Welsh Institute for Research
in Economics and Development, Cardiff Business School.
‘…Dr Dan Streetmentioner’s Time Traveller’s Handbook of 1001 Tense Formations..
will tell you for instance how to describe something that was about to happen to you
in the past before you avoided it by time-jumping forward two days in order to avoid
it…’
Douglas Adams The Restaurant at the End of the Universe 1980 pp79-80.
Wanhill (1980) published his impressive
econometric study of Wales based on
data over the years 1948 to 1970. He
estimated the employment effects of
Welsh regional policy, finding it was
responsible for around 20,000 jobs at
the beginning of his period in 1949 and
for some 105-110,000 jobs by 1970.
The implication was that the proportion
of employment due to regional policy
was rising, while employment ‘in the
absence of policy’ was apparently falling
after 1956-7. 
More recent investigations of regional
policy effects in Wales include the
findings of the Welsh Assembly’s
Economic Research Unit that both at
Welsh and UK levels, over the period
1990-98, non-Regional Selective
Assisted (RSA) plants tended to exhibit
faster productivity growth. The latest
work on the official website now shows
that  productivity in Wales on average is
The convoluted grammar required of
those who would simulate the Welsh
economy, perhaps with a view to
stimulating it, will already be familiar to
time travellers. Answering the question
‘What would have happened had policies
been different?’ (when they were not,
the ‘counterfactual conditional’) is part
of the answer to ‘what action should we
take so that living standards will be
higher?’ Simulating entails taking an
artificial, simplified, economy and
seeing how it responds to a range of
policies or other changes. If the
simplifications are appropriate, then the
simulations will predict accurately the
impacts of possible future changes, as
well as what the effects would have
been in the past. 
The Welsh economy simulations
discussed in the present paper are not
the first with this broad type of model. A
quarter of a century ago Stephen
the same as elsewhere in the UK1.
However higher productivity is
associated with not being in an assisted
area and/or not having received RSA.
Since to maintain the international
competitiveness necessary to provide
jobs, Welsh industry needs high and
increasing productivity, RSA appears to
have been found wanting. 
On the other hand RSA’s immediate
objective is jobs, not productivity.
Indeed without increases in outputs,
higher productivity means fewer jobs.
So it is not so surprising that RSA has
apparently not delivered greater
productivity. Instead, if official numbers
are accepted, between 1971 and 2001
RSA in Wales ‘created and safeguarded’
about one third of today’s total
employment. 
On top of this the Welsh Development
Agency (WDA) has also been busy
‘creating and safeguarding’ apparently
on a much larger scale. If the WDA’s
own figures are to be believed, the
recent announcement of their
forthcoming absorption by the Welsh
Assembly Government  was certainly
not an instance of evidence-based
policy. For in each of the last five years
the WDA maintained they had created
and safeguarded more jobs than in the
last. In the last full financial year the
total was double that of  2001/2, and
over the quinquennium the WDA
claimed credit for 153,000 jobs, getting
close to sum of all Welsh manufacturing
employment!2
The UK National Audit Office (2003),
citing the calibrated model of Gillespie et
al (2001),  has criticised English regional
policy spending for not delivering what
was claimed and presumably there must
be similar doubts about such assertions
in Wales. It would at a minimum be
useful to know how long these ‘created
or preserved’ jobs last on average. In
principle answers could be obtained
from a regional model such as the one
discussed below. Other policies of
interest that might be examined in the
same model include the consequences
of the Richard Commission favouring
income tax-varying powers for the
Welsh Assembly, should legislative
authority be granted.  If the concern is
to boost employment why not cut taxes
on labour - employers’ national
insurance? Government employment in
Wales has gone up massively over a
generation; it would be useful to know,
with what effects.
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WERU Conference 2004
In May 2004, the Welsh Economy Research Unit held its 12th annual conference. The conference theme was Quo
Vadis: Where Next for the Welsh Economy? Following the conference, speakers were invited to provide a summary
of their presentations for this Review. Those received are published below. A wide range of issues was debated
during the conference, and WERU would like to thank all conference speakers and delegates for their participation.
The Model Structure
To allow an assessment of the impact on
the Welsh economy of such policies, we
have developed a model from the work
of Patrick Minford and collaborators
(1991, 1994, 1995). It is based on the
distinction between tradable and non-
tradable goods, critical to spatial
economics.  Without tradable goods, or
rentier income in the broadest sense,
there is no (spatial) economy. A
subsistence, ‘grow your own’, economy
produces its own tradable (food)
products though it chooses not to trade.
The tradable sector in a particular
location is a basis for that place
supporting a population. Alternatively, a
pensioner (say) can in principle locate
independently of tradable production
because the pension income pays for
tradable imports (such as food).  In the
long run, the level of Welsh demand as
a whole depends upon spending derived
from ‘tradable’ industry and from
government, or other, ‘unearned’,
income. 
The traded sector is assumed to
correspond with manufacturing and the
non-traded with all other private sector
production. These sectors respectively
mainly employ unskilled and skilled
labour. The unskilled labour is assumed
immobile whereas the skilled labour is
mobile (in and out of Wales). As much
capital as wanted is supposedly
available at the world price. Traded
product prices are determined in the
world market. There is also a public
sector, the behaviour of which is
determined outside the economic
system.
It follows that employers’ (unit) labour
costs for the traded sector are also fixed
(by world prices and the available
technology). Manufacturing employment
is then determined by the supply of
labour to manufacturing. Manufacturing
employment establishes manufacturing
output and manufacturing output
governs non-manufacturing output,
together with employment. The public
sector also influences non-manufacturing
output.
The equation system can be represented
as follows;
Assumed 
1. Traded wage = f (price of traded
goods, world cost of capital,
technology, labour taxes)
Estimated
2. Labour Supply to the Traded Sector
= g (traded wage, income tax,
unemployment benefit) 
3. Traded Sector output = h (traded
sector employment, traded wage,
traded price, technology)
4. Non-traded Non-public Sector
Output = k (Demand, prices of
traded/ non traded goods)
5. Non-traded Non-public Sector
Employment = m (non-traded
output, non-traded wages, labour
taxes, prices non-traded)
6. Non-traded after-tax real wage = n
(working population, UK wage,
prices, taxes)
7. Working population = q (natural
increase, net migration,
participation rate (sickness benefit)) 
8. Demand = r (traded output,
government spending)
Definition
9. Unemployment = Working
population - (traded + non-traded
+ public sector employment)
Model Behaviour
As modelled, variations in domestic
demand affect only non-tradable output
and employment. Stronger domestic
demand boosts non-tradable output.
There is no link from domestic demand
to manufacturing production, because
all manufactures consumed are
assumed imported and all manufactures
produced are assumed exported.
Stronger domestic demand should
increase imports of traded goods but
they are not substitutes for domestic
production. Manufacturing therefore
cannot be ‘crowded out’ by this process.
Nonetheless it can be squeezed by
reductions in the labour supply induced
by other changes. 
There is no explicit government budget
constraint in the model because the
present arrangement is for taxes to be
paid to the UK government which in
return makes available a block grant to
finance Welsh Assembly spending.
Government consumption and
investment give rise to public sector
employment. Increased government
spending therefore has a labour market
impact through working population.
Greater expenditure raises working
population by inducing net migration or
participation. The impact of public
sector employment (public
administration, health, education)
depends on whether the appointments
are primarily from the immobile or
mobile labour forces. If from mobile
labour forces, an expansion of the public
sector may reduce output in the non-
traded sector and perhaps increase the
working population by migration. Also
there are multiplier effects as if public
sector employees were exporting,
because government spending (from
the block grant) allows more importing.
On the other hand, expanding state
employment of immobile workers
crowds out genuine export industry
jobs. The magnitude of this effect
depends on the coefficient on
government employment in the export
employment supply function and the
working population equation.
Government expenditure additionally
enters as a component of demand,
influencing non-traded output, and
expenditures on sickness and invalidity
and unemployment benefit, have supply
effects, determining traded
employment. Thus the immediate
impact of a pro-rata increase of all items
of government expenditure is to reduce
private traded sector output and
employment and increase non-traded
sector output and employment.
However if transfer payments are
separated from other government
spending (as may be appropriate for
some policy simulations because the
benefit payments are not part of the
block grant) and not increased at the
same time, there is only the positive
effect on the non-traded sector and the
direct employment impact.
Qualitative Policy Simulations 
If this model captures the broad outlines
of the Welsh economy then we can
expect the following qualitative policy
impacts. 
• If technical efficiency is advanced,
real wages in manufacturing rise and
unemployment falls. 
• A reduction in the labour tax rate
(employers’ national insurance
contribution), boosts the after-tax
manufacturing wage, which increases
employment and output. 
• Regional Selective Assistance, a
capital subsidy, raises or lowers
employment depending on capital
substitution.
• Reductions in income tax, or in the
cost of living expand unskilled
labour supply. At the margin people
are inclined to work more and more
people are inclined to work if they are
allowed to keep a higher proportion of
their earnings, or their earnings buy
more. This boosts output and
employment.
• Greater government spending
increases non-manufactured output,
holding manufactured output
constant (no crowding out) and
raises working population (through
migration).
Quantitative Simulations
Several exercises are undertaken below
to show the quantitative behaviour of
model-determined (endogenous)
variables of interest for policy. Of
particular concern are employment and
output. The responses are considered of
these dependent variables to alternative
values of influences operating from
outside the model (exogenous
variables). Of particular concern for
Welsh policy are the impacts of changes
in income tax, in the employment
(national insurance) tax, in the effective
cost of capital and in numbers on
sickness benefit. Table 1 presents the
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effect of selected shocks, obtained by
assuming a temporary increase in the
corresponding exogenous variable for
three consecutive years for the 1991-
1993 period. 
Simulation 1- Employment Tax. 
As indicated earlier, a permanent fall in
manufacturing wages can be brought
about by a rise in the tax on
employment  (national insurance
contribution) without affecting gross
unit labour costs, determined on world
markets.  Table 1 (column 5) show the
effects of a one per cent rise in this
‘taxfirm’ variable (and the opposite
movement of the manufacturing wage
rate), in the short term. Manufacturing
employment falls by 0.44%, or 871
jobs, with manufacturing output
declining by the same percentage.
Lower activity in the traded sector has a
negative effect on non-traded sector
output, which falls by around 0.04%.
Employment in the non-traded sector
declines by 0.5%, or some 3,410 jobs.
Considered as a job creating strategy,
the overall cost per extra job is £42,000
in revenue forgone. But the direct
effects of the tax increase, eliminating
marginal firms and reducing profits and
employment, has not been taken into
account in this simulation. These would
reduce the cost per job. However the
implicit assumption in this simulation is
that when taxes are increased, so also is
spending, and the positive demand
effects approximately offset the
negative direct impact of the increase.
For this reason the result cannot be
compared with the supposedly lower
cost per job of  RSA. The RSA (or Welsh
Development Agency costs) do not take
into account the jobs destroyed by the
taxation necessary to finance such
support.
Simulation 2 - International
Competitiveness.
A 1% increase in gross manufacturing
wage, which can be brought about only
by a change in international
competitiveness, raises manufacturing
employment by almost 0.5%, creating
an extra 970 jobs (column 3). The
expansion in manufacturing output is
2.5%. More manufacturing output raises
demand, which then boosts the non-
traded sector.  Non-traded output and
demand increase by 1.98% and 3.88%
respectively. The reduction in
unemployment during the same period
is rather small, -0.48%, because the
rise in non-manufacturing jobs comes
from a larger working population. 
Simulation 3 - Unemployment Benefits
A 1% rise in real unemployment
benefits contracts manufacturing
employment by changing the trade-off
with net take-home pay (column 1).
Some workers in the manufacturing
sector substitute leisure for work.
Employment in this sector falls by
0.49% causing a similar reduction in
manufacturing output. Consequently,
unemployment rises by 0.09%. The
contraction in manufacturing sector
spills over into the non-traded sector,
where output initially falls 0.15%. Total
output and demand drop by 0.15% and
0.38% respectively. Total employment
falls by 0.11%,  or 1300 jobs.
Simulation 4 -  Income Tax
A one pence in the pound rise in income
tax induces a 0.61% fall in
manufacturing output and employment
(column 2). Again, the contraction
effects in the manufacturing sector spill
over into the non-traded sector. Non-
traded output falls by 0.09% triggering
a 0.19% reduction in GDP. Total
employment falls by 0.4%, or some
4,891 jobs while working population is
also reduced, by 0.14%, because of
emigration and withdrawal from the
work force. As with the employment tax,
this is purely a supply side effect, the
consequence of the disincentive effects
of taxation reducing labour supply.
There is no direct effect of taxation on
demand in the version of the model
simulated here. Had this effect been
modelled, the adverse effects of
taxation would have been greater. Since
taxation is separated from spending by
the financial arrangements for
devolution, there is no necessity to
assume that in general higher taxing will
be associated with any changes in
government spending. However where a
tax increase is assumed to originate
from a hypothetically empowered Welsh
Assembly, it is reasonable also to
assume a matched increase in spending
and therefore an approximate offset to
the demand impact of a tax hike.  
Considering the policy as a job creation
or destruction exercise,  a 1p in the £
cut on the average manufacturing sector
wage, for example, costs £217/year/
employee (£418/week*1%*52 weeks).
For both sectors combined the cost per
job is £42,712. 
Simulation 5. Government  Spending
A 1% increase in government
expenditure on employees leads to a
rise in Welsh demand and has no impact
on the Welsh manufacturing sector
(column 6). Unemployment falls and the
working population rises by 0.03%. For
7
Welsh Economic Review
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
+1% +1p in £ International +1% +1% +1%
Unemployment  Income tax competitiveness Sickness/ Employment Government
Benefit Invalidity tax (and fall in spending
Benefit manufacturing
wage)
GDP -0.15% -0.19% +1.31% - -0.12% +0.29%
Manufacturing output -0.49% -0.61% +2.44% - -0.43% -
Non-Manufacturing output -0.15% -0.09% +1.98% - -0.04% +0.15%
Welsh Demand -0.38% -0.18% +3.88% - -0.07% +0.29%
Employment -0.11% -0.40% +0.89% -0.004% -0.35% +0.07%
(4,891) (4,281) (858)
Non-Manufacturing -0.06% -0.54% +1.56% -0.007% -0.50% +0.12%
Employment (3,683) (3,410)
Manufacturing employment -0.49% -0.61% +0.5% - -0.44% -
(1,208) (871)
Working population -0.04% -0.14% +0.04% -0.039% -0.13% +0.03%
Unemployment rate +0.09% +0.26% -0.48% -0.033% +0.22% -0.04%
Note: Number of jobs in parenthesis. The estimates are for year 2001. 
Table 1 Short Term Impact of Shocks.
year 2001 a 1% increase in spending
implies that the government has to raise
roughly an additional £96 million. The
indirect employment effects are 858
jobs to which must be added the direct
employment consequences, perhaps
another 1500 jobs on average, perhaps
£40,000 a job. This does not include the
negative effects of a tax increase and so
is not directly comparable the tax
changes discussed above. Taking these
into account would raise the cost per job
further.
Regional Selective Assistance
No simulation was undertaken to
determine the employment impact of
RSA, but in this model it depends
critically upon the substitutability of
labour and capital (as well as on the
burden of taxation already mentioned).
The parameters of the present model
imply that (ignoring the tax costs) an
RSA capital subsidy policy is beneficial in
the short term3 but is actually harmful
to employment in the long run4.
Conclusions
Without models, such as that employed
here, it is difficult to estimate what
would have happened or what will
happen if various policy changes are
implemented. Economies are complex
social organisations; one thing leads to
another, and yet another, so that a
policy conceived with one objective may
even have the opposite effect. Models
are simplifications, but to obtain
quantitative conclusions from them for
convincing policy exercises they should
correspond with the most important
facts of the economy. The ‘fitting’ of the
model discussed in this paper to a large
number of time series on the Welsh
economy is quite a rigorous criterion of
relevance. 
The provisional quantitative conclusions
obtained from the model and
simulations so far are that:
• A reduction in the tax on labour,
employers’ national insurance,
appears to be an expensive form of
job creation at £40,000 a year. This
is because all the employers who
would not expand jobs receive the
tax cut as well as those that will.
However in the exercise reported
here only the supply side effects of
the tax are estimated, assuming
matching expenditure changes, in
contrast to conventional cost per
job estimates. 
• Government spending on average
must be  more expensive for
creating direct jobs than income tax
cuts, simply because the difference
between these estimates and the
tax estimates are too small to cover
the demand impacts that are
excluded from the tax effects.
Smaller government linked with
correspondingly lower income or
employment tax rates would raise
total employment in Wales.
• Capital subsidies such as RSA boost
employment on average in the short
run (say one year) but in the longer
run displace jobs through capital
substitution. The elasticity of
substitution between capital and
labour is a critical parameter for
RSA in the present model; the
higher the elasticity the less
favourable the impact on
employment of the policy of
implicitly subsidising capital. When
the elasticity exceeds unity there is
an adverse effect.
Endnotes
1 http://www.wales.gov.uk/subiresear
ch/content/eru/projects/productivity
-growth-e.htm
2 http://www.wda.co.uk/resources
/A3_Main_AR2004_E.pdf
3 The short-run elasticity of
substitution is 0.7.
4 Harris and Robinson (2003)
investigate the impact of RSA on
total factor productivity, rather than
on employment, and impose an
elasticity of one by assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function. They
find no effect within assisted areas
(excluding Scotland).
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Higher Education in Wales:
An Economic Driver?
Sir Brian Smith, Vice Chancellor of
University of Wales, Cardiff 1993 to
2001 
In 2002 A Winning Wales-The National
Economic Development Strategy set a
challenging target for the Welsh
Economy.  It took as ‘the main goal of
our economic policies’ the raising of
Welsh GDP per person from 80 percent
to 90 percent of the UK average by 2012
(though recognising the difficulty of
setting a precise timescale).  This would
reverse a decline from 85 percent of the
UK average in 1989 to 79 percent in
2001.  How can this be achieved? The
natural resources that fuelled the
growth of industrial Wales in the 19th-
century are gone. Labour-intensive
assembly plants and call centres which
have helped to provide valuable
employment in recent years cannot be
more than a stopgap.  For Wales to be
successful, in the years to come, it must
be capable of harnessing new ideas and
technology to establish a knowledge-
based economy. Institutions of Higher
Education (HEIs) will play a critical role
in this transformation. 
The Third Mission
In addition to the traditional roles of
teaching and research, a further
responsibility is now placed on HEIs. It
is called the Third Mission and its
purpose is to ‘meet the needs of
business and the community,
contributing to economic and social
development both regionally and
nationally’. The government has
attached considerable importance to
this new role. In 2000 the Department
of Trade and Industry brought out a
White Paper on Science and Innovation
Policy for the 21st century.  Following its
implementation, a substantial sum of
money was provided for research in key
areas. The funding was provided
specifically to ‘build on universities’
potential as drivers of growth in the
knowledge economy’.  In addition, a
University Challenge Competition
provided seed venture funding for
knowledge transfer.  In both England
and Wales the governments have
recently stated their commitment to
maintaining a permanent third stream
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of funding for institutions of higher
education.  Currently this support, in
England, is consolidated in the Higher
Education Innovation Fund that will
provide £90 million per annum;
approximately 0.8% of the total income
of HEIs in England.  In Wales a Higher
Education Economic Development
(HEED) Fund (soon to be renamed) of
£3.1 million a year is to be made
available over the next three years;
about 0.4% of total HEI income.  This
fund will enable higher educational
institutions to provide the posts and
infrastructure needed to contribute to
the development of the economy.  This
year, the focus of the fund has been
broadened to ‘encompass both the
economic and social agendas’.  In
addition the Knowledge Exploitation
Fund (KEF) has been established to
‘provide support for the effective
transfer of knowledge and expertise
from both higher and further education
institutions to industry’.  The fund was to
provide £40 million over the next three
years, but it has recently been
announced that the figure is to be
reduced by £5 million.  The
administration of this Fund has now
been transferred from the Higher
Education Funding Council for Wales to
the Welsh Development Agency which is
undertaking a review to determine how
it will be managed.
Concurrently, with the provision of Third
Mission funding, universities were given
both the intellectual property rights for
government funded research and the
obligation to exploit them.  It was felt
that there needed to be a change ‘away
from the practice of avoiding risk by
holding on to intellectual property from
research at the centre of government’ to
devolving this responsibility to
universities if it was to be effectively
managed.  
The Higher Education Industry
There is no better example of a
knowledge-based industry than Higher
Education and, before turning to the
various ways in which HEIs can
stimulate economic growth, it is
appropriate to consider their direct
contribution to the regional economy.  A
recent publication, The Economic
Impact of Higher Education in Wales by
Professor Stephen Hill of the Glamorgan
Business School, reports that Higher
Education in Wales is a £1 billion
industry. It generates some 24,000 jobs
in Wales and is twice as important to
Wales, in employment terms, as the
Energy, Water Supply, Mining and
Quarrying industries put together.
Universities, it has been calculated, can
add income up to £10,000 a year for
each family in their region, especially if
they are situated in small communities,
as is often the case in Wales. The total
income of Welsh higher education
institutions is some £700 million of
which approximately half comes from
public funds.  Of this some £250 million
is repaid in taxes.
Welsh higher education also contributes
by bringing in approximately £100
million from overseas students. Higher
education is one of the fastest growing
world industries.  A review
commissioned by the British Council has
estimated that the number of students
educated outside their own countries
will increase by 8 percent per annum
amounting to a factor of three by 2020.
Wales is well positioned to take
advantage of the financial opportunities
that this burgeoning foreign student
market will generate in the future.  The
higher education institutions have
recently established the Wales
International Consortium to market the
higher education opportunities available
in Wales.
Education and Entrepreneurship
HEIs make an important contribution to
the economy by the provision of high-
level skills.  Unfortunately, many
institutions find it hard to fill places in
some of the subjects essential to the
development of a high-tech economy.
This is particularly true of engineering
and physical sciences.  Institutions are,
of course, demand led and, if a shortage
of skills appears, they can only rectify it
if a sufficient number of young people
wish to seek the appropriate training.
This is to a large degree determined by
the value society places on the skill in
short supply. The shortage is
compounded by the fact that, at the
present time, only half those trained in
the physical sciences take-up
employment that uses their technical
skills.  Many are tempted to take further
qualifications in, for instance,
accountancy where they believe the
rewards are higher.
A significant way in which HEIs can help
the economy is by creating among
students, graduates and staff a culture
of entrepreneurship.  A number of local
and national initiatives have been
established to help this process.  The
Graduates to Enterprise Programme is a
pilot scheme which provides young
graduates, postgraduate and research
staff with formal training in core
business skills. A further scheme, the
Science Enterprise Challenge, aimed to
establish a number of regional centres
of excellence to enable the universities
selected to provide support to
entrepreneurial individuals through
developing, either within the existing
degree programmes or through
supplementary studies, course materials
that will equip the students at all levels
with the knowledge and skills necessary
to run successful enterprises.  
Knowledge Exploitation
Around major universities, notably in
the United States, centres of high-tech
companies have grown.  The most
quoted example is Stanford and Silicon
Valley, but in Harvard and MIT near
Boston, and indeed in Oxford and
Cambridge in this country one can see
similar development.  The businesses
that spin-out from universities are
usually high-tech and most are in
biotech, medical devices, software and
electronics.  The companies are usually
small but can grow with remarkable
speed. (The first five spin-out
companies launched by Isis Innovation
in Oxford that went public were valued
at £2 billion in 2000.)
Universities can facilitate this is spin-out
process in two ways.  The first is to
provide direct support.  Until recently
that has been confined to technical
expertise and the release and
secondment of the key staff.  However a
government initiative, the £45 million
University Challenge Seed Fund,
launched in association with the
Welcome Trust and the Gatsby
Foundation, has provided a limited
number of universities with funds to
support the creation of spin-out
companies. Cardiff University and the
University of Wales College of Medicine
and the University of Wales,
Aberystwyth were early beneficiaries of
this fund.  As a result, these universities
will be able to play a direct role in
stimulating and supporting spin-off
companies.  This fund was set up to plug
the “development gap” that exists
between the recognition of a commercial
opportunity arising from university
research programmes and that phase of
company growth that can attract more
traditional venture capital and other
funding support.  
These initiatives to facilitate spin-out
companies have been very successful in
the UK and particularly in Wales.  In
2002 UK universities generated 158
spin-out companies, one for every £15
million of research expenditure and 2.7
per million of population.  Over the
same period the United States saw 494
spin-outs, one for every £44 million
spent and 1.7 per million of population.
Both the number of patents taken up by
UK universities and their income from
consultancy increased by some 20
percent in that year.  During recent
years not only was there increased focus
on innovation but, at the same time,
perhaps due to the continuing Research
Assessment Exercises, the quantity and
quality of research in British universities
was improving leading to more
opportunities for commercial
development.
The year 2000–01 saw the number of
Welsh spin-out companies increase from
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5 to to 17 representing approximately 8
percent of the total spin-outs in the UK
from educational institutions.  Thus in
Wales a spin-out company is generated
for every £9 million of research
expenditure and 5.7 per million of
population, a significantly higher rate
than in the UK or United States. In the
same year graduate business start-ups
in Wales were 23 percent of the UK
total.  Welsh HEIs had approximately 8
percent share of the UK Teaching
Company Schemes linking industry and
academic research.  If these figures are
sustained Wales can look forward with
confidence to the contribution of its HEIs
to economic growth.
Intellectual property is also developed
when ideas originating in universities
are licensed to business.  This tends to
be the procedure most often followed
when universities collaborate with larger
companies.  Wales has been particularly
successful in this regard.  A few years
ago, the University of Wales College of
Medicine had the highest earnings from
the exploitation of intellectual property
of all the institutions in the UK.  Cardiff
University, with an income from
licensing of some £1 million per annum,
is comparable to the most successful US
universities which generate royalty
income equivalent to 2-3% of their
annual research expenditure. This would
indicate that the licensing income
generated by all Welsh HEIs could reach
between £3-4.5 million  a year.  Of
course ideas that are licensed to
established businesses are often
exploited outside Wales and indeed
often outside the UK.  It is essential to
establish a business climate in Wales
that can profit from inventions and ideas
generated in our institutions of higher
education.
Supporting Business
It has been said that higher education’s
most important role is to ‘inject the
adrenalin of innovation into the
bloodstream of the economy’.  Higher
education is both a source of new ideas
and a provider of expertise,
technological developments and
facilities that can assist business and
individuals to explore new ideas.
Innovation is not necessarily about
major breakthroughs. Incremental
improvement is just as important,
particularly in the case of smaller
companies (SMEs). 
Many HEIs have made successful efforts
to encourage links with business but it
has proved very difficult for them to
engage with SMEs. Cardiff has built links
through the Cardiff University
Innovation Network. The Innovation
Network encourages a partnership
approach to innovation by providing an
informal, flexible forum where like-
minded business people can attend
regular meetings to network with each
other and with members of the
University and local business support
groups.  These meetings address
problems and issues that have been
selected by a group of senior executives
of SMEs who guide the Innovation
Network in all its activities. The numbers
attending meetings are typically 80-
100, and it is an important feature that
more than half are from business. The
network also provides a freephone
helpline which can be called by any
SMEs with a problem or inquiry and over
600 problems have been solved since
the helpline set up a few years ago.
The enthusiasm of SMEs for the network
is most encouraging.  However, the
network is just one of many initiatives to
provide support for SMEs in Wales.
HELP-WALES is an example of the
initiative which involves all the HEIs in
Wales working together to pool their
resources and facilities to assist SMEs.
This scheme provided subsidised
consultancy support for SMEs to work
with any one or more of the 7,000 or so
academic and research staff in our HEIs.
In addition the Go Wales fund of £1.9
million per annum funds a number of
activities including a project to
encourage graduates to work in SMEs.
The Research Culture
Perhaps the most important factor in
determining HEIs capacity to support
economic growth is the strength of their
research base. The 2000 White Paper
concluded ‘Major innovations flow from
breakthroughs made by curiosity driven
research’.  It is no accident that the
universities which are famous for
producing spin-off companies and for
stimulating growth in their local
economies are also famous for the
fundamental research they do. British
research is second only to the United
States in its importance.  With only one
percent of the world’s population we
produce eight percent of the world’s
scientific papers and they receive over 9
percent of citations.  This is one of the
areas where we can claim to be truly
world-class. It is most important that
universities continue to develop
research of the highest quality.  Only in
this way will the ideas be generated the
can lead to the founding of new
businesses and the significant
development of existing companies. It is
very important to ensure that the
research we carry out is focused on the
future.  I asked a leading engineer from
Stanford what British universities
needed to do to be able to create our
own Silicon Valley’s.  His answer was
unequivocal: ‘spend less time
supporting existing industry and think
more about creating the industries of
the future’. 
The Foresight programme, which brings
people from universities and industry
together to identify areas of research
considered critical to economic
progress, can help us to plan that
future, but it cannot foretell the future.
We cannot predict where the research
ideas that are blossoming in our young
research staff’s minds will take us
forward in the new millennium.  A recent
government document states that it will
no longer ‘go back to the situation
where the government attempted to
pick winners’.  Clearly some degree of
concentration of research effort is
beneficial, but over-prescription can
lead to a loss of opportunities.  Who
would have envisaged 15 or 20 years
ago that the information technology
tools developed by the international
particle physics research community to
maintain contact with each other would
form the basis of the multibillion pound
industry that the Internet has become
today?
But good research is only the first step.
It was recently reported in the press
that, although Britain was second only
to the United States in recording patents
in biotechnology, the majority of these
patents were in foreign ownership.
Innovation requires the correct
economic climate, with the opportunity
for firms to make investments that will
provide benefits only in the longer term. 
Conclusions
HEIs are well placed in the UK, and
particularly in Wales, to take the lead in
the drive to a knowledge-based, high-
tech economy. Over the past few years
we have had considerable success
particularly with the development of
spin-out companies.  The quality of the
Welsh research base, which has caused
so much concern in the past, is now
improving.  Welsh HEI’s share of
Research Council funding, though still
below that indicated by the size of the
sector, has improved significantly over
recent years. Much is  being done in our
HEIs to harness innovation and to
stimulate entrepreneurship.  However,
much more needs to be done.  We need
to make all businesses aware of the
power of higher education.  Many
smaller companies still need convincing
that HEIs, in particular the universities,
can provide them with valuable support.
Within HEIs we need to develop further
and maintain units that can provide a
professional approach to the problems
of business support. 
Institutions of higher education will play
their part in leading Wales to a brighter
economic future.  To do this our HEIs
will need to continue to:
• develop strong research capacity,
• establish effective procedures for
encouraging the exploitation of
intellectual property (through
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licensing and spin-out companies),
• create strong links with business to
enable businesses (especially SMEs)
to benefit from their expertise.
Realising the Potential of
Wales’ Rural Economy
Professor Peter Midmore, School of
Management and Business, University
of Wales Aberystwyth. 
Wales is a more rural country than
England. That provides one
rationalization, among many others, for
devolution; policies can be designed to
suit rural circumstances better, taking
local understanding and preferences
into account. Depending on definitions,
improving the performance of the rural
economy is much more important for
Wales. In general terms, the areas
around the M4 and A55 corridors are
performing at least as well as the UK
average, so, together with the Valleys,
the rest of the interior of Wales provides
the main obstacle to achieving the
headline GDP targets guiding the
Assembly’s economic strategy.
Economies, and particularly rural
economies, are not easy to define.
There are distinguishing characteristics,
such as industrial structure (rural
activities tend to be more based on
primary, land-based sectors),
demography (countryside populations
are older), culture (lifestyles are
different), and of course population
density. On the last feature, “rural
Wales” would consist of local authority
areas with less than 50 residents per
square kilometre (the OECD definition),
forming a contiguous area from the
Northwest, all of Mid and West Wales,
and the far Southeast.1 This rural block,
however, is far from homogenous,
especially in economic terms.
Economists often try to represent the
systems that they study as a set of
simultaneous equations, showing the
interdependence between sales and
purchases of different sectors. But for
rural economies, and this is particularly
relevant in Wales, there is hardly any
integration at all. They are more like
dependent satellites of nearby
metropolitan economies, with few of the
variables in the set of equations having
any value other than zero.
This presents a headache for
policymakers, since efforts to stimulate
economic growth leak away much more
quickly than they would in an urban
context. Reliance on inward
manufacturing investment as the source
of new employment is often
inappropriate given its vulnerability to
closures, and given that SMEs can be
major employers in scattered
communities with small workforces.
Hence, a primary objective for rural
regeneration should be to build local
self-reliance as much as possible. Low
population means that there will always
be considerable external dependence,
but as much as possible of the external
revenues should be retained locally to
build up a resilient structure of
businesses and employment.
A more reflective policy, based on this
principle, should develop from a review
of the current extent of rural economic
problems, an assessment of future
potential, and a brief examination of the
policy benchmarks set out by other,
similar regions. The statistical base is
not good; one of the problems of a
sparse population. Table 1 shows some
summary indicators of the economic
situation for most of rural Wales (for
many indicators, Carmarthen,
Ceredigion and Pembrokeshire are
combined; income figures for Monmouth
are amalgamated with the highly urban
Newport unitary authority area; and
even at this level, there are huge gaps
in information on wages). 
These summary figures show that low
wages rather than absolute lack of work
contribute to lagging rural economic
performance, and that strong population
growth from in-migration has done little
yet to contribute to the solution. These
figures also fail to show variations within
this area of Wales. The most extreme
example is Anglesey, where a high
concentration of disadvantage in urban
Holyhead drags down what would
otherwise be a more respectable
accomplishment. 
More insightful detail can be brought
together from the simple structure of a
Strengths and Weaknesses,
Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)
analysis. Strengths clearly include the
quality of the natural environment, both
in landscape and biodiversity. Against
that background, resonances of the
culture of small communities with
distinctive lifestyles are an attraction for
visitors, for those who move in more
permanently, and for the indigenous
population. The quality of educational
provision is high, with several
universities, good performance by
schools, and adequate vocational
training. Although small in size, the
quality workforce is an asset provided
that the right match of employment
opportunities exists, and there are
localised clusters of manufacturing.
There are clear competitive advantages
in tourism and niche food processing. 
Offsetting this, for much of the area
transport and communication is very
difficult. Perhaps as a result, there is no
cohesive identity, and the rural interest
is neglected, and often invisible.
Agricultural incomes have been slowly
but steadily declining, and with it the
influence of the once powerful farm
lobby. The quality of tourism provision is
poor, and far fewer resources are
devoted to supporting its upgrade than
in other areas of development.
Compared with other parts of Wales, it
has been difficult to attract inward
investment. There are no agglomeration
economies, and the lack of critical mass
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GVA per head Population Net migration Activity rate Wages 
as % UK £ (‘000) as % of total in working (£/week)
population population (%)
Isle of Anglesey 52 68 -2.7 68.1 ..
Gwynedd 63 117 2.5 79.9 393.40
Conwy and Denbighshire 62 203 6.9 77.5 353.10
South West Wales 62 362 6.0 71.3 ..
Powys 69 126 7.0 83.0 371.20
“Rural” Wales 62 876 5.2 75.5 ..
Table 1: Rural Wales: Summary Economic Indicators
Source: Office for National Statistics. 
Note: All figures are for 2001 except migration, which is for 1991-2001.
in labour and other markets means that
it is hard to match supply and demand
to generate internal linkages. All of
these influences, in combination, make
rewarding careers for young people thin
on the ground, and contribute to the
demographic ‘hole’ in the rural
population between school leavers and
the middle aged. An aspiration gap in
terms of drive and vision seems to
occur, reflected in the small numbers of
high-growth SMEs.
Opportunities then exist for tourism
development, mainly in the specialised
areas of culture, landscape and
environment. Policy shifts to
environmental management in farming,
where specific connections to tourism
can be exploited, will expand this
potential, and also where food can be
linked, niche agri-food marketing could
be improved. Because of the large
distances between scattered
businesses, many opportunities which
could exist to improve internal linkages
are simply unrecognised. However,
improved networking, perhaps by
making greater use of ICTs, could
realise them. Also, there is still much
scope for attracting lifestyle in-migrants
in the high value end of ICT
development, particularly as Broadband
is increasingly connecting the Welsh
countryside. Many existing in-migrants
have business skills which are untapped,
and more could be made of the higher
education establishments’ new
commitments to working to enhance
their local economies and to spin out
technology transfer.
Some clear threats relate to uncertainty
from the implementation of the latest
round of CAP reform and EU expansion.
Decoupled farm payments may have the
many different effects, of which at least
the possibility of significantly reduced
output exists, jeopardising many
upstream and downstream linkages.
Other developing effects of
globalisation, particularly the flight of
manufacturing industry to Southeast
Asia, will undermine many enterprises
unless they have a significant
competitive advantage. Similar impacts
may be felt from the centralisation of
public sector and utility activities.
Modern lifestyles (especially those of in-
migrants) may erode the social capital
base of communities – ironically, since
often that is a significant component of
the initial attraction. And finally,
uncertainty about changes in the fee
basis for higher education could limit the
effectiveness of these institutions as
fertile growth poles in otherwise
sluggish markets.
There is no template for successful rural
regeneration, as the specific
circumstances of each area vary so
much. The search for neat, workable
definitions has always foundered
because there are many different types
of “rural”. Contrast, for example, some
areas of Powys close to the English
border with the Lleyn Peninsular, or
North Pembrokeshire. There are,
however, common principles which are
recognisable in examples of some
impressive development performances
in rural areas of Europe and North
America. First, competitive advantage
needs identifying and then robustly
exploiting, in order to increase the flow
of external income. This requires
considerable flexibility in response to
changing market conditions. Secondly,
as much of possible of these earnings
needs to be retained in local incomes,
by “plugging the leaks”. This requires
businesses to network collaboratively,
sharing information informally as a
means to benchmark their performance,
and also continually searching for and
developing synergies where they exist.
Thirdly, both of these processes need to
be underpinned by robust social capital,
and “institutional thickness”; the latter
is a concept developed by Amin and
Thrift (Globalisation, Institutions and
Regional Development in Europe,
Oxford University Press) which
expresses the degree to which
networked firms can interact with
supportive public institutions whose aim
is to develop and embed entrepreneurial
dynamism.
On sober reflection, rural Wales falls far
short with regard to these principles,
but the gap is at its widest in respect of
institutional thickness. Its clearly
distinctive problems are not dealt with
comprehensively, but are split between
all four of the economic forums which
are charged with regeneration, three of
which have a majority urban population.
Local authorities, and the Assembly
Sponsored Public Bodies with an
economic remit, are inward looking and
defensive, and consequently there is no
structure which allows local public
leaders to play a key role in vision
building and coordinated intervention.
The one framework which offers most to
development of rural social capital,
business networking and particularly
tourism development, the European
Commission’s LEADER Plus initiative,
will cease in 2006, as the framework of
regional policy is tilted eastwards. 
Can the Welsh Assembly Government be
persuaded that greater effort should be
made to revitalise local government,
reorient public bodies to make their
rural remit more effective, and refresh
their own strategies? Since most of the
governing party represent urban
constituencies, and all of the Cabinet
are from Greater Cardiff, one might
suspect that their appetite for action
was faint. One argument, though, might
work. Because participation rates are
substantially above average in rural
Wales, relatively modest improvements
in productivity could have a more
marked effect on Gross Value Added.
The potential that is displayed by similar
rural regions elsewhere suggests that an
improved and innovative economic
focus, responded to by businesses,
could raise wage levels substantially.
With a 12-14% improvement, the rural
GVA gap would be well on the way to
being covered. With a roughly similar
population, half of the Wales gap would
disappear, leaving only the more
intractable difficulties of the Valleys to
be dealt with. 
Endnote
1 Isle of Anglesey, Gwynedd, Conwy,
Powys, Ceredigion, Pembrokeshire,
Carmarthenshire Monmouthshire.
Re-Imagining Wales’ 
Economic Future: No More
Snake Oils Please.
Professor John Lovering, Department of
City and Regional Planning, Cardiff
University. 
Will devolution turn out to have
transformed the Welsh economy?
Devolution has certainly increased the
flow of information, which is now more
thorough, far-reaching and accessible
than in pre-devolution days. But in the
world of analysis, interpretation,
prognosis and policy development,
things have not progressed so far. If the
pronouncements of the Welsh Assembly
Government’s ‘Economics Minister’ are
to be believed, Wales is about to enter
an era of profound change. A little
caution seems in order.
Since the future is by definition
unknown, imagining it is a matter of
informed guesswork.  The trouble arises
when that guesswork is excessively
influenced by ideological assumptions.
The ‘economy’ is after all not a tangible
entity but an evocation of ideas on what
constitutes wealth, and how it can be
acquired and distributed. Since these
involve not only technical but also
ethical and political judgements,
economic policy has always been a
rather ideological business. In recent
times this has been particularly evident
in the rise, and fall, of a series of
‘explanatory-prescriptive paradigms’
which have shaped assessments of
Wales’ economic problems, and their
remedies.
The Golden Age
Between about 1950 and 1975
economic policy in Britain, as elsewhere,
was framed by a welfare-nationalist
conception of the role of the state.  The
basis of economic growth was the
recirculation of increasing working class
12
Welsh Economic Review
incomes, and the national production of
the housing, manufactures and services
that implied. Wales’ fortunes depended
on getting its share of that action, and
Keynesian regional policy largely made
sure that it did. Manufacturing jobs were
relocated from the Midlands and South
east. Explicit regional measures played
only a relatively minor role overall. Far
more importantly, the public sector
steadily expanded, creating new job
opportunities in relatively decent
conditions of employment. Moreover,
national welfare benefits and national
union-negotiated wage systems meant
that real incomes of most people rose
steadily, and social and spatial
inequalities generally declined. The
stock in trade of politicians seeking
election was to promise more of the
same, and generally, from whichever of
the two major parties, they provided it. 
De-industrialisation
All that ground to halt in the mid 1970s.
When Jim Callaghan, Prime Minister and
MP for Cardiff South, adopted what
came later to be called ‘neo-liberalism’
(or ‘Thatcherism’) as part of the deal to
get the International Monetary Fund
loan, the trends of the ‘Golden Age’
went into reverse. The principle shaping
economic thinking began to shift from
the need for jobs to the need for mobile
capital to be able to cross borders with
minimum constraints. Regional policy
was gradually rebuilt on the assumption
that ‘regions’ should be treated as
economic entities, rather than merely
geographically labelled parts of a
national economic system. The
economic prospects for Wales came to
be seen as depending on its ability to
‘globalise’. To this end the branch plant
economy should become more
‘dynamic’. To help this inward
investment was to be encouraged (a
shift that took on real potency as it gave
the otherwise anachronistic WDA
something politically acceptable to do).
Together with a new push for labour
market flexibility this would help trigger
an industrial ‘culture shock’ that would
precipitate a new Age of
Entrepreneurship. 
It did not arrive, though Wales did
indeed become the most ‘globalised’
region in the UK. Overseas firms
became more prominent in
manufacturing, and large chains began
to take over much of the service
industries. But self-employment
remained virtually static (it actually
declined in the 1990s). Wales overall
slipped further behind England. The
number of full-time jobs per head of the
labour force began its long decline. If
this was globalisation, for most people it
did not work.
On the one hand the growth of
‘privatism’ meant people became less
aware of,  or bothered by, the economic
conditions of their neighbours. On the
other, many people were re-categorised
out of existence. The number of people
in Britain defined as long-term unfit for
work quadrupled in the 1980s and
1990s to 2.1 million – a far more rapid
increase than could be explained by
medical trends.  The geographical
pattern of long-term illness in the UK
today suggests that rates reflect not so
much the health of people’s minds and
bodies as the health of the local labour
market. If it is a long-term effect rather
than a cause of economic weakness, the
apparent growth of ‘ill-health’ in South
Wales should not therefore be too
hastily attributed to particular Welsh
lifestyle choices.
Globalisation and Competitiveness
By the early 1990s, the idea that
regions should be treated as if they
were quasi-independent economic units,
capable of standing on their own
competitive feet, had trickled down from
the mountains of Reaganite-Thatcherite
revelation and was being picked up by a
wide range of policy-makers and ideas-
entrepreneurs, (it had a particular
impact on the European Commission,
for which regional development was a
major activity). The result was the New
Regionalism, the now-ubiquitous
ideology that the region (or,
increasingly, the city-region) is the
appropriate scale for policy to create
competitive economic ‘units’ fitting a
globalised world. 
This spawned a new sequence of
explanatory-prescriptive ‘paradigms’,
and networks giving voice to them. The
first fixation was with ‘post-Fordism’ and
the related obsession with flexibility and
innovation. This became Wales real
problem. Yet though it was (and is) true
that Wales ‘innovates less’ than some
other parts of the UK, the economic
significance of this - how it relates to
local standards of livings - has never
been examined. The new imported
anxiety over innovation was
accompanied by a set of medicines.
Things would be improved by a spray of
initiatives to boost networking,
encourage industrial ‘clusters’, upgrade
the quality of inward investment,
enhance local supply chains, encourage
more research and development, and
university high-tech ‘spin-off’s. 
Some valuable projects resulted, but
little changed in terms of aggregate
economic trends. The share of Welsh
manufacturing employment accounted
for by foreign firms continued to
increase, but by this time only because
the total amount of employment
actually fell. Overall, Welsh income and
employment growth was determined, as
before, mainly by the continued growth
in the service sector, especially that part
driven by public spending. Yet, this was
insufficient to make a real dent on
unemployment (Datris, 2004). 
Combining ‘Competitiveness’ with
‘Sustainability’
In Wales and in the UK the failure of
globalised manufacturing to provide
jobs also encouraged a shift of interest
to the service industries, and a widening
to consider the ‘human side’ of the
economy. This Hayekian-Liberal agenda
of re-engineering civil society to better
fit the needs of the global market was
first made explicit in the Thatcher years.
It was modified through the 1990s with
the addition of a neo-Durkheimian
emphasis on the need for social
cohesion. Over the following years,
especially after the election of New
Labour in 1997, the social dimension of
the latest paradigm became more
explicit under the banner of the Third
Way.
Economic prognoses increasingly
stressed the need for modifying training
and education provision, and beyond.
Following the model exemplified by the
National Strategy for Neighbourhood
Renewal (Communities First in Wales)
and the New Deal, labour market
interventions were reformed in the
name of improving skills and motivation,
but also targeting which helped reduce
‘social exclusion’. From the late 1990s
European Labour Market strategy
(largely shaped by Britain) required
each member country to prepare its own
action plan detailing just how this would
occur. Wales’ plan however was merely
an arithmetic derivative of the UK’s, and
was not debated by the Assembly.
The new emphasis on the social
preconditions of global competitiveness
was packaged in the language of
‘sustainability’. Few words have had
their meaning transformed so rapidly.
Sustainability entered global policy
discourse in the early 1990s as a
challenging environmental demand. It is
now widely regarded as a label for
attempts to somewhat reduce waste,
and social disruption. Symptomatically,
although the Assembly has a legal
commitment to Sustainable
Development this has never caused it to
rethink its economic strategy. The
Assembly does its non-thinking about
these matters on the edge of the one of
the most environmentally unsustainable
(and socially ambivalent) developments
in Europe – Cardiff Bay.  For Welsh
Labours’ ‘Economy Minister’, but equally
for critics such as Kevin Morgan (2004),
sustainability has come to be defined
almost entirely in Third Way terms,
embracing initiatives for social inclusion,
and waste minimisation, in the wider
service of competitiveness (see also
Thomas and Rhisiart, 2004).
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Knowledge, Culture 
By 2000 the ever-growing wish-list -
innovation, constantly-upgrading skills,
increased entrepreneurship, better
health and (thereby) sustainable
competitiveness - was being re-
described in terms of a new paradigm,
the ‘Knowledge Economy’. This is at
once almost boundless in its range of
possible applications and extraordinarily
nebulous in terms of substance. But the
meaning of words is how they are used.
These have been used in practice to
bless at one pole late-Hayekian visions
for the reconstruction of education and
training, and at another the desirability
of promoting this or that venture
because it is a ‘cultural industry’. 
The idea that culture is the key to
economic competitiveness dovetailed
with what academics (especially in
Geography) celebrated as the ‘cultural
turn’. The arrival of New Labour
intensified official interest. Chris Smith,
the first ‘culture minister’ published a
book enthusing about the economic
benefits of Britain’s cultural industries,
but also noting that culture is a good
thing in its own right. The latter has
received conspicuously little attention as
the instrumentalist promotion of cultural
industries has risen to top the local
economic development charts. The
theory is that cultural industries provide
the social infrastructure appropriate to
modern competitive cities  (Florida
2002). On the ground, this has affected
economic outcomes mainly by
legitimating changes in planning. 
This has been particularly evident in
Cardiff, which has acquired sports
stadia, opera houses, conference
centres, night-clubs and - next -
casinos. This has been sold to those who
live alongside it, and pay for it, as
improving competitiveness. Whether
that has any substance remains to be
seen (these have so far often added to
rather than reduced costs).  Meanwhile
it makes visible the increasing gap
between the capital city  and the rest of
Wales.
The Public Sector and the Non-
global Economy
The main economic motors of Wales
(Cardiff included) are not the Knowledge
Economy, or exports of manufactures or
‘cultural products’.  They are public and
consumer spending; both serving
localised rather than global markets.
The public sector remains central –
directly accounting for virtually the
entire increase in the early 2000s.
Despite this, some commentators
regard the public sector as an economic
negative, except for those parts that can
be squeezed into the definition of the
Knowledge Economy (see Cooke 2003).
This is to develop policy-making for
Wales as if it is really only a soggy
version of Singapore in disguise. How
confident would you feel if your doctor
prescribed for you on the basis of a
diagnosis of someone else?
The most damaging consequence of the
overlapping recent sequence of
‘paradigms’ of analysis and diagnosis
has been the total disregard for non-
globalised markets, along with a
reductionist view of the public sector.
For these are particularly important in
Wales – it is not an island turning out
Knowledge-based exports. The ‘play
economy’ for example, especially
entertainment, recreation, clubbing,
spectator-sports, etc (Woudhuysen
2001), has been a major spur to growth
from the biggest city to the smallest
towns.  The public sector plays a crucial
background role here too in that
changes in UK regulations concerning
drinking (and next gambling), have
transformed the market, and local
planners have been central to getting
particular projects off the ground.  
This should not be surprising. The most
affluent regions and most large cities in
the world are driven not only by external
trade and investment, but also by the
bubbling spontaneity of local supply and
demand, and public services. The belief
that the former are always and
everywhere the most important is a
recent ideological invention, with a fairly
obvious history. Interestingly the
sources most commonly cited as
‘Authoritative’ are sociologists or
business analysts – such as Manuel
Castells or Michael Porter - whose work
does not actually show that at all. 
The Changing Goals of Economic
Governance
Interpretations of, and policies for the
Welsh economy have drifted some way
from the realities over the past couple of
decades.  At least the Keynesian
regionalists knew what they were
talking about, but then they were closer
to the levers of power.  The issues
identified as priorities today, by
organisations that have rather less
economic leverage, frequently lack any
explicit logic in terms of the overall
economic dynamics of Wales. It is surely
revealing that there has been not one
serious attempt since devolution to
analyse how these actually work. This
despite a proliferation of committees,
advisory groups, networks and glossy
publications. The important work on
input-output tables by WERU does not
seem to have impacted on policy
thinking. Two thirds of women in Wales
work in only two sectors, neither of
which wears the badge of ‘Knowledge
Economy’.  It seems that policy still
arrives at Wales rather than arising from
it. 
The current rhetoric - being holistic,
taking the longer view, and seeking to
link economic to other goals, including
sustainability - has all the right words.
But much needs to change to give them
the kind of substance most people
associate with them. They would need
to become strategies drawn out in terms
of the specific dynamics of Welsh
economy and society. For example, as
we have seen the extent to which the
‘global competitiveness imperative’
does, and should, govern Wales’s
economic development is currently
defined solely by assertion. It is properly
a matter for research.
Into the Future 
All the fanfares for a new Welsh
economic dawn turned out to be just
forgettable tunes. Talk of ‘high-tech’
clusters, science parks, the Knowledge
Economy, and now the cultural
industries has often meant little more in
practice than privileging a modest
industrial expansion here and there, a
fair amount of property development,
and acres of news print. Their impact on
the economic development of Wales as a
whole has not been overriding. 
Meanwhile, we can all see that some
things are happening. A spate of
redevelopment is visibly transforming
Wales’ cities – along with most cities in
the world.  A possibly even more
portentous post-agricultural
commodification of the countryside is
visibly underway.  But neither suggest
that Wales will cease to be relatively
backward in terms of most economic
indicators compared to the south of
England – currently rapidly transforming
into a sprawling ‘global mega-city’.  
Within Wales the geography of economic
development seems likely to take on a
more ‘city-regional’ pattern.  Related to
this, development seems likely to fall
further under the influence of
‘boosterism’. The Americanisation of
Welsh economic governance is most
apparent in the emergence of alliances
between local political leaders,
bureaucrats, property developers, and
service-sector investors (mainly sports
and drink corporations) finding common
ground in prominent commercial
projects. This poses a potentially
significant challenge to the ability of the
Assembly to impose any coherence on
economic development, if it wants to.
The problem may be intractable if this
style of ‘urban regeneration’ is, as some
argue, the spatial corollary of globalising
neo-liberalism, and this remains the
over-arching framework conditioning
the economics of devolution.
This path will certainly bring new
uncertainties. Urban regeneration
projects depend on the buoyancy of
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property investors’ sentiments. Some
(St Davids II, the Sports Village) will be
vulnerable to any new volatility in global
property markets and interest rates. The
social dimension of the push for
sustainability is also imponderable.
Despite the considerable efforts being
made in community development and
social inclusion in various arenas, the
prospects for reducing ‘real joblessness’
will remain limited so long as they
continue to lack the context of a credible
aggregate employment strategy. Policies
targeting one or other group for ‘social
inclusion’ may yet again end up mainly
rearranging the sequence of faces in the
queue. 
More Politics, not Less
If devolution is to have a more
productive economic impact it needs to
open up new kinds of economic debate,
both in terms of the analytical
perspectives and values considered, and
those doing the considering. One
positive point is that devolution has
obliged (and Electoral Commission
funding enabled) all the Welsh political
parties to think out their strategies in
more depth than ever before. But they
have a very long way to go.
So do the educational institutions.
Academia engages with Welsh economic
development mainly through inevitably
myopic contract research. It could do
much more on a broader canvas by
reviving its traditional civic responsibility
role. Open fora for on-going wide-
ranging debate are urgently needed –
perhaps the annual WERU conference
offers one model to build on.
The core of the problem is the lack of
any real popular engagement with
economic strategy.  Rather than widen
the debate, devolution has encouraged
the insistence that the number one
priority is consensus.  The story
sketched here suggests the opposite.
Wales’ most worrying economic
weaknesses is not that there is too
much politics in its economics, but too
little.
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NOTE
Jonathan Price of the Welsh Assembly Government’s Economic Research Unit presented a paper entitled Emerging Research
Findings: Economic Inactivity. A power point presentation is available at www.weru.org.uk
